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Abstract
We extend the Consumption-based CAPM (C-CAPM) model to representative agents
with different risk attitudes. We use the concept of expectation dependence and show that
for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree expectation dependence rather
than the covariance that determines C-CAPM’s riskiness. We extend the assumption of risk
aversion to prudence and provide an additional dependence condition to obtain the values of
asset price and equity premium. Results are generalized to higher-degree risk changes and
higher- order risk averse representative agents, and are linked to the equity premium puzzle.
Key words: Consumption-based CAPM; Risk premium; Equity premium puzzle;
Expectation dependence; Ross risk aversion.
JEL classification: D51; D80; G12
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Introduction

The consumption-based capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM), developed in Rubinstein (1976),
Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979) and Grossman and Shiller (1981), relates the risk premium on
each asset to the covariance between the asset return and the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution of a decision maker. The most important comparative static results for C-CAPM
is how an asset’s price or equity premium changes as the quantity of risk and the price of
risk change. The results of comparative statics analysis thus form the basis for much of our
understanding of the sources of changes in consumption (macroeconomic) risk and risk aversion
that drive asset prices and equity premia.
The two objectives of this study are to propose a new theoretical framework for C-CAPM and
to extend its comparative statics. We use general utility functions and probability distributions
to investigate C-CAPM. Our model provides insight into the basic concepts that determine asset
prices and equity premia.
The C-CAPM pricing rule is sometimes interpreted as implying that the price of an asset
with a random payoff falls short of its expected payoff if and only if the random payoff positively
correlates with consumption. Liu and Wang (2007) show that this interpretation of C-CAPM is
not generally correct by presenting a counterexample. We use more powerful statistical tools to
obtain the appropriate dependence between asset payoff and consumption. We first discuss the
concept of expectation dependence developed by Wright (1987) and Li (2011). We show that,
for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree expectation dependence between the
asset’s payoff and consumption rather than the covariance that determines C-CAPM’s riskiness.
Our result also reinterprets the covariance between an asset’s payoff and the marginal utility of
consumption in terms of the expectation dependence between the asset’s payoff and consumption
itself. We extend the assumption of risk aversion to prudence and provide another dependence
condition. Finally, we interpret C-CAPM in a general setting: for the ith -degree risk averse
representative agent,1 with i = 2, .., N + 1, it is the N th -order expectation dependence that
determines C-CAPM’s riskiness.
1

Risk aversion in the traditional sense of a concave utility function is indicated by i = 2, whereas i = 3

corresponds to downside risk aversion in the sense of Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980). ith -degree risk aversion
is equivalent to preferences satisfying risk apportionment of order i. See Ekern (1980) and Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) for more discussions.
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Our contribution is linked to the recent literature on higher-order risk preferences and higherorder moments and comoments in finance developed by Harvey and Siddique (2000), Dittmar
(2002), Mitton and Vorkink (2007), Chabi-Yo et al. (2007), and Martellini and Ziermann (2010).
We provide a theoretical foundation for the pricing kernel model based on higher comoments
than the covariance by suggesting a more general definition of dependence between consumption
and asset payoff, and propose a general pricing formula not restricted to specific utility functions.
Our study also relates to Gollier and Schlesinger (2002) who examine asset prices in a
representative-agent model of general equilibrium with two differences. First, we study asset
price and equity premium driven by macroeconomic risk as in the traditional C-CAPM model
while Gollier and Schlesinger’s model considers the relationship between the riskiness of the
market portfolio and its expected return. Second, Gollier and Schlesinger’s model is a one
period model whereas our results rest on a two-period framework.
Finally, our study extends the literature that examines the effects of higher-degree risk
changes on the economy. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) investigate necessary and sufficient
conditions on preferences for a higher-degree change in risk to increase saving. Our study
provides necessary and sufficient conditions on preferences for a higher-degree change in risk to
set asset prices, and sufficient conditions on preferences for a higher-degree change in risk to set
equity premia.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces several concepts of dependence. Section
3 provides a reinterpretation of C-CAPM for risk averse representative agents. Section 4 extends
the results of Section 3 to prudent and higher-order risk averse agents respectively. Section 5
discusses the results in relation to local indexes of risk aversion and higher-order moments and
comoments. Section 6 interprets the results in terms of the equity premium puzzle and concludes
the paper.

2

Concepts of dependence

The concept of correlation coined by Galton (1886) had served as the only measure of dependence during the first 70 years of the 20th century. However correlation is too weak to obtain
meaningful conclusions in many economic and financial applications. For example, covariance
is a poor tool for describing dependence for non-normal distributions. Since Lehmann’s introduction of the concept of quadrant dependence in 1966, stronger definitions of dependence have
2

received much attention in the statistical literature2 .
Suppose x̃ × ỹ ∈ R × R are two continuous random variables. Let F (x, y) denote the joint
and Fx (x) and Fy (y) the marginal distributions of x̃ and ỹ. Lehmann (1966) introduces the
following concept to investigate positive dependence.
Definition 2.1 (Lehmann, 1966) (x̃, ỹ) is positively quadrant dependent, written as P QD(x̃, ỹ),
if
F (x, y) ≥ Fx (x)Fy (y)

f or all (x, y) ∈ R × R.

(1)

The above inequality can be rewritten as
Fx (x|ỹ ≤ y) ≥ Fx (x)

(2)

and Lehmann provides the following interpretation of definition (2.1): “knowledge of ỹ being
small increases the probability of x̃ being small.” PQD is useful to model dependent risks
because it can take into account the simultaneous downside (upside) evolution of risks. The
marginal and the conditional CDFs can be changed simultaneously.3
Wright (1987) introduced the concept of expectation dependence in the economics literature.
The following definition, uses a weaker definition of dependence than PQD.
Definition 2.2 If
F ED(x̃|y) = [E x̃ − E(x̃|ỹ ≤ y)] ≥ 0 f or all y ∈ R,

(3)

then x̃ is positive f irst − degree expectation dependent on ỹ.
The family of all distributions F satisfying (3) will be denoted by F1 . Similarly, x̃ is negative
first-degree expectation dependent on ỹ if (3) holds with the inequality sign reversed. The
totality of negative first-degree expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by G1 .
Wright (1987, page 113) interprets negative first-degree expectation dependence as follows:
“when we discover ỹ is small, in the precise sense that we are given the truncation ỹ ≤ y,
our expectation of x̃ is revised upward.” First-degree expectation dependence is a stronger
definition of dependence than correlation, but a weaker definition than quadrant dependence.
2
3

For surveys of the literature, we refer to Joe (1997), Mari and Kotz (2001) and Embrechts (2009).
Portfolio selection problems with positive quadrant dependency have been explored by Pellerey and Semeraro

(2005) and Dachraoui and Dionne (2007), among others. Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) assert that a large subset
of the elliptical distributions class is PQD. For examples of distributions, see Joe (1997).
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Therefore, many bivariate random variables being positive (negative) quadrant dependent are
also first-degree expectation dependent. But positive (negative) correlated random variables
are not necessary positive (negative) first-degree expectation dependent. We provide a simple
example of two random variables that are positively correlated but not positive first-degree
expectation dependent.
Example Let x̃ be normally distributed with E x̃ = µ > 0 and var(x̃) = σ 2 . Let ỹ = x̃2 . Since
E x̃2 = µ2 + σ 2 and E x̃3 = µ3 + 3µσ 2 , then
cov(x̃, ỹ) = E x̃ỹ − E x̃E ỹ

(4)

= E x̃3 − E x̃E x̃2
= µ3 + 3µσ 2 − µ(µ2 + σ 2 ) = 2µσ 2 > 0.
By definition,
q

F ED(ỹ| −

q

µ2 + σ 2 ) = E x̃2 − E(x̃2 |x̃ ≤ − µ2 + σ 2 )

(5)

q

= µ2 + σ 2 − E(x̃2 |x̃ ≤ − µ2 + σ 2 ) < 0,
and we obtain (ỹ, x̃) ∈
/ F1 .
Note that the expectation dependence concept is not symmetric (for more discussion, see Wright,
1987). Li (2011) proposes the following weaker definition of dependence:
Definition 2.3 If
SED(x̃|y) =
=

Z y
−∞

Z y

−∞

[E x̃ − E(x̃|ỹ ≤ t)]Fy (t)dt

(6)

F ED(x̃|t)Fy (t)dt ≥ 0 f or all y,

then x̃ is positive second-degree expectation dependent on ỹ.
The family of all distributions F satisfying (6) will be denoted by F2 . Similarly, x̃ is negative
second-degree expectation dependent on ỹ if (6) holds with the inequality sign reversed, and the
totality of negative second-degree expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by G2 .
It is obvious that F1 ⊆ F2 and G1 ⊆ G2 but the converse is not true. Because x̃ and ỹ are
positively correlated when (see Lehmann 1966, lemma 2)
cov(x̃, ỹ) =

Z +∞ Z +∞
−∞

−∞

[F (x, y) − Fx (x)Fy (y)]dxdy =
4

Z +∞
−∞

F ED(x̃|t)Fy (t)dt ≥ 0,

(7)

again we see that cov(x̃, ỹ) ≥ 0 is only a necessary condition for (x̃, ỹ) ∈ F2 but the converse is
not true. Comparing (6) and (7), we know that cov(x̃, ỹ) is the 2nd central cross moment of x̃
and ỹ while SED(x̃|y) is related to 2nd central cross lower partial moment of x̃ and ỹ which can
be explained as a measure of downside risk computed as the average of the squared deviations
below a target.
For our purpose of extending the C-CAPM model, comparative expectation dependence
has to be defined. We propose the following definition to quantify comparative expectation
dependence.
Definition 2.4 Distribution F (x, y) is more first-degree expectation dependent than H(x, y) if
and only if F EDF (x̃|y)Fy (y) ≥ F EDH (x̃|y)Hy (y) for all y. Distribution F (x, y) is more second
order expectation dependent than H(x, y), if F EDF (x̃) ≥ F EDH (x̃), and
SEDF (x̃|y) ≥ SEDH (x̃|y) f or all y.

(8)

Sibuya (1960) introduces the concept of dependence function ΩF :
ΩF =

F (x, y)
.
Fx (x)Fy (y)

(9)

Since log(ΩF ) = log(F (x, y))−log(Fx (x)Fy (y)), “more first-degree expectation dependent” compares the difference between F (x, y) and Fx (x)Fy (y) whereas Sibuya’s definition compares the
difference between log(F (x, y)) and log(Fx (x)Fy (y)).

3
3.1

C-CAPM for a risk averse representative agent
Consumption-based asset pricing model

Suppose that an investor can freely buy or sell an asset with random payoff x̃t+1 at a price
pt . The investor’s preference can be represented by a utility function u(.). We assume that all
derivatives for u(.) exist. Denote ξ as the amount of the asset the investor chooses to buy. Then,
his decision problem is to
max u(ct ) + βEt [u(c̃t+1 )]
ξ

s.t. ct = et − pt ξ
c̃t+1 = et+1 + x̃t+1 ξ,

5

(10)

where et and et+1 are the original consumption levels, β is the subjective discount factor, ct is
the consumption in period t, and c̃t+1 is the consumption in period t + 1.
From the first order condition of this problem, we can obtain the well-known consumptionbased asset pricing model which can be expressed by the following two equations (see e.g.
Cochrane 2005, page 13-14)4
pt =

Et x̃t+1
covt [u0 (c̃t+1 ), x̃t+1 ]
+
β
,
Rf
u0 (ct )

(11)

and
Et R̃t+1 − Rf = −
where gross return R̃t+1 =

x̃t+1
Pt

covt [u0 (c̃t+1 ), R̃t+1 ]
Et u0 (c̃t+1 )

(12)

in period t + 1, Rf is the gross return of the risk-free asset, u0 (·)

is the marginal utility function, E R̃t+1 − Rf is the asset’s risk premium. As for expectation
dependence, covt [u0 (c̃t+1 ), x̃t+1 ] and covt [u0 (c̃t+1 ), R̃t+1 ] are not symmetric.
The first term on the right-hand side of (11) is the standard discounted present-value formula.
This is the asset’s price for a risk-neutral representative agent or for a representative agent when
asset payoff and consumption are independent. The second term is a risk aversion adjustment.
(11) states that an asset with random future payoff x̃t+1 is worth less than its expected payoff
discounted at the risk-free rate if and only if cov[u0 (c̃t+1 ), x̃t+1 ] ≤ 0. (12) shows that an asset
has an expected return equal to the risk-free rate plus a risk adjustment under risk aversion.
When the representative agent’s utility function is the power function, u(ct ) =

ct1−γ −1
1−γ

where

γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and c̃t+1 and x̃t+1 are conditional lognormally distributed, (12) becomes (Campbell 2003, page 821)
Et r̃t+1 − rf +

vart (r̃t+1 )
= γcovt (log c̃t+1 , r̃t+1 ),
2

(13)

where r̃t+1 = log(1 + R̃t+1 ) and rf = log(1 + Rf ).
(13) states that the log risk premium is equal to the product of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion and the covariance of the log asset return with consumption growth. We now provide
a generalization of these results.
From Theorem 1 in Cuadras (2002), we know that covariance can always be written as
0

covt [u (c̃t+1 ), x̃t+1 ] =
4

Z +∞ Z +∞
−∞

−∞

[F (ct+1 , xt+1 ) − Fct+1 (ct+1 )Fxt+1 (xt+1 )]u00 (ct+1 )dxt+1 dct+1 .(14)

Equations (11) and (12) can also be obtained in a muti-period dynamic framework from Euler equations. For

more details, see Constantinides and Duffie (1996).
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Because we can write
Z +∞
−∞

[Fxt+1 (xt+1 |c̃t+1 ≤ ct+1 ) − Fxt+1 (xt+1 )]dxt+1 = E x̃t+1 − E(x̃t+1 |c̃t+1 ≤ ct+1 ),

(15)

(see, e.g., Tesfatsion (1976), Lemma 1), hence, we have
covt [u0 (c̃t+1 ), x̃t+1 ]

=
=

Z +∞

−∞
Z +∞
−∞

(16)

[E x̃t+1 − E(x̃t+1 |c̃t+1 ≤ ct+1 )]Fct+1 (ct+1 )u00 (ct+1 )dct+1

(by (15))

F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )u00 (ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 )dct+1 .

Using (16), (11) can be rewritten as
Et x̃t+1
f
| R
{z }

pt =

−β

discounted present value ef f ect

=

Et x̃t+1
−β
Rf

Z +∞
−∞

|

Z +∞
−∞

F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 )[−
{z

u00 (ct+1 )
]dct+1(17)
u0 (ct )
}

f irst−degree expectation dependence ef f ect

F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 )AR(ct+1 )M RSct+1 ,ct dct+1 ,

00

(x)
where AR(x) = − uu0 (x)
is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient, and M RSx,y =

u0 (x)
u0 (y)

is the marginal rate of substitution between x and y.5
We can also rewrite (12) as
Et R̃t+1 − Rf =

Z +∞
−∞

F ED(R̃t+1 |ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 ) [−

|

{z

}

consumption risk ef f ect

Because Rf =

u0 (ct )
1
β Et u0 (c̃t+1 )

Et R̃t+1 − Rf = βRf

|

u00 (ct+1 )
] dct+1
Et u0 (c̃t+1 )
{z

(18)

}

price of risk ef f ect

(see e.g. Cochrane 2005, page 11), we also have
Z +∞
−∞

F ED(R̃t+1 |ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 )AR(ct+1 )M RSct+1 ,ct dct+1

(19)

(17) shows that an asset’s price involves two terms. The effect, measured by the first term on
the right-hand side of (17), is the “discounted present value effect.” This effect depends on the
expected return of the asset and the risk-free interest rate. The sign of the discounted present
value effect is the same as the sign of the expected return. This term captures the “direct”
effect of the discounted expected return, which characterizes the asset’s price for a risk-neutral
representative agent.
The second term on the right-hand side of (17) is called “first-degree expectation dependence effect.” This term involves the subjective discount factor, the expectation dependence
5

Andersen et al. (2011) propose a multi-attribute risk aversion model that allows one to separate the intertem-

poral risk aversion coefficient into the risk aversion coefficient and the MRS
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between the random payoff and consumption, the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient and the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The sign of the first-degree expectation dependence indicates whether the movements on consumption tend to reinforce (positive first-degree
expectation dependence) or to counteract (negative first-degree expectation dependence) the
movements on an asset’s payoff.
(18) states that the expected excess return on any risky asset over the risk-free interest rate
can be explained as the sum of the quantity of consumption risk times the price of this risk.
The quantity of consumption risk is measured by the first-degree expectation dependence of the
excess stock return with consumption, while the price of risk is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion
coefficient times the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
We obtain the following proposition from (17) and (18).
Proposition 3.1 Suppose F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) and F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) are continuous, then the following
statements hold:
(i) pt ≤

Et x̃t+1
Rf

for any risk averse representative agent (u00 ≤ 0) if and only if (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈

F1 ;
(ii) pt ≥

Et x̃t+1
Rf

for any risk averse representative agent (u00 ≤ 0) if and only if (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈

G1 ;
(iii) Et R̃t+1 ≥ Rf for any risk averse representative agent (u00 ≤ 0) if and only if (R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈
F1 ;
(iv) Et R̃t+1 ≤ Rf for any risk averse representative agent (u00 ≤ 0) if and only if (R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈
G1 .
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.1 states that, for a risk averse representative agent, an asset’s price is lowered (or equity premium is positive) if and only if its payoff is positively first-degree expectation dependent with consumption.

Conversely, an asset’s price is raised (or equity pre-

mium is negative) if and only if its payoff is negatively first-degree expectation dependent
with consumption.

Therefore, for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree

expectation dependence rather than the covariance that determines its riskiness.

Because

(x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ F1 (G1 ) ⇒ covt (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ≥ 0(≤ 0) and the converse is not true, we conclude
that a positive (negative) covariance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a risk averse
agent paying a lower (higher) asset price (or having a positive (negative) equity premium).
8

3.2

Comparative risk aversion

The assumption of risk aversion has long been a cornerstone of modern economics and finance.
Ross (1981) provides the following strong measure for comparative risk reversion:
Definition 3.2 (Ross 1981) u is more Ross risk averse than v if and only if there exists λ > 0
such that for all x, y
u00 (x)
u0 (y)
≥λ≥ 0 .
00
v (x)
v (y)

(20)

More risk averse in the sense of Ross guarantees that the more risk averse decision-maker is
willing to pay more to benefit from a mean preserving contraction.
Our important comparative statics question is the following: Under which condition does
a change in the representative agent’s risk preferences reduce the asset price? To answer this
question let us consider a change in the utility function from u to v. From (17), for agent v, we
have
pt =

Et x̃t+1
−β
Rf

Z +∞
−∞

F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )FCt+1 (ct+1 )[−

v 00 (ct+1 )
]dct+1 .
v 0 (ct )

(21)

Intuition suggests that if asset return and consumption are positive dependent and agent v
is more risk averse than agent u, then agent v should have a larger risk premium than agent u.
This intuition can be reinforced by Ross risk aversion and first-degree expectation dependence,
as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Let put and pvt denote the asset’s prices corresponding to u and v respectively.
Suppose u0 , v 0 , u00 and v 00 are continuous, then the following statements hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ F1 if and only if v is more Ross risk averse than u;
(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ G1 if and only if u is more Ross risk averse than v;
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.3 indicates that, when an asset’s payoff is first-degree positive (negative) expectation dependent on consumption, an increase in risk aversion in the sense of Ross decreases
(increases) the asset price.
The results of Proposition 3.3 cannot be obtained with the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion
measure. We consider the convenient power utility form u(c) =

c1−γu −1
1−γu

and v(c) =

c1−γv −1
1−γv .

γu and γv are u and v’s relative risk aversion coefficients respectively. Intuition would suggest
that, when an asset’s payoff and consumption are positively dependent, γu ≥ γv implies that
9

put ≤ pvt . However, the following counter example shows that, in the range of acceptable values
of parameters, a lower Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition to obtain higher price when asset’s payoff and consumption are first-degree
positive expectation dependent6 .
Counter Example Suppose u(c) =

c1−γ −1
1−γ ,

c̃t+1 ∈ [1, 3] almost surely and (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ F1

(note that in this case covt (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ≥ 0), from (18) we obtain
pt =

Et x̃t+1
−β
Rf

=

Et x̃t+1
−β
Rf

Z +∞
−∞

Z +∞
−∞

F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 )[−
F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 )

u00 (ct+1 )
]dct+1
u0 (ct )

−γ−1
γct+1

Et c̃−γ
t+1

(22)

dct+1 ,

hence, when an asset’s payoff and consumption are positively first-degree expectation dependent,
dpt
dγ

≤ 0 if and only if d

γc−γ−1
t+1
Et c̃−γ
t+1

/dγ ≥ 0. We now show that d

−γ−1
γct+1

Et c̃−γ
t+1

/dγ ≥ 0 is not always verified

because it contains the variations of the marginal rate of substitution. Since
d
we obtain

dpt
dγ

γc−γ−1
t+1
Et c̃−γ
t+1

/dγ =

c−γ−1
t+1

{[1
2
(Et c̃−γ
t+1 )

−γ−1
−γ
2
− γ(γ + 1)c−1
t+1 ]Et c̃t+1 + γ Et c̃t+1 },

(23)

−γ−1
−γ
2
≤ 0 if and only if [1 − γ(γ + 1)c−1
t+1 ]Et c̃t+1 + γ Et c̃t+1 ≥ 0. Because
−γ−1
−γ
2
[1 − γ(γ + 1)c−1
t+1 ]Et c̃t+1 + γ Et c̃t+1

1
−γ−1
2
≤ [1 − γ(γ + 1)]Et c̃−γ
t+1 + γ Et c̃t+1
3
then for γ = 2 and c̃t+1 such that Et c̃−γ
t+1 =

1
5

(24)
(since c̃t+1 ≤ 3 almost surely),

−γ−1
=
and Et c̃t+1

1
21 ,

we have

1
1
4
−γ−1
2
[1 − γ(γ + 1)]Et c̃−γ
< 0.
t+1 + γ Et c̃t+1 = − +
3
5 21

(25)

Therefore, a higher Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition to obtain a lower price.

3.3

Changes in joint distributions

The question dual to the change in risk aversion examined above is as follows: Under which
condition does a change in the joint distribution of random payoff and consumption increase
the asset’s price? We may also ask the same question for the risk premium by using the joint
distribution of an asset’s gross return and consumption. To address these questions, let us denote
6

When x̃t+1 = c̃t+1 , the asset price is always monotone in the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion (Gollier

2001, p336-337).
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EtH and F EDH as the expectation and first order expectation dependency under distribution
H(x, y). Let pFt and pH
t denote the corresponding prices under distributions F (x, y) and H(x, y)
respectively. From (17), we have
pH
t =

EtH x̃t+1
−β
Rf

Z +∞
−∞

F EDH (x̃t+1 |ct+1 )HCt+1 (ct+1 )[−

u00 (ct+1 )
]dct+1 .
u0 (ct )

(26)

From (17) and (26), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.4 (i) Suppose F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) is continuous and EtF x̃t+1 = EtH x̃t+1 , then pFt ≤
pH
t for all risk averse representative agents if and only if F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) is more first-degree
expectation dependent than H(xt+1 , ct+1 );
(ii)Suppose F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) is continuous, then for all risk averse representative agents, F (Rt+1 , ct+1 )
is more first-degree expectation dependent than H(Rt+1 , ct+1 ) if and only if the risk premium
under F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) is greater than under H(Rt+1 , ct+1 ).
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.4 shows that a pure increase in first-degree expectation dependence represents an
increase in asset riskiness for all risk averse investors. The next corollary considers a simultaneous
variation in expected return and dependence.
Corollary 3.5 For all risk averse representative agents, EtF x̃t+1 ≤ EtH x̃t+1 and F (xt+1 , ct+1 )
is more first-degree expectation dependent than H(xt+1 , ct+1 ) imply pFt ≤ pH
t .
Proof The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (17) and (26).
Corollary 3.5 states that, for all risk averse representative agents, a decrease in the expected return and an increase in the first-degree expectation dependence between return and consumption
will decrease the asset’s price. Again, the key available concept for prediction is comparative
first-degree expectation dependence.

4
4.1

C-CAPM for a higher-order risk averse representative agent
C-CAPM for a risk averse and prudent representative agent

The concept of prudence and its relationship to precautionary savings was introduced by Kimball
(1990). Since then, prudence has become a common and accepted assumption in the economics
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literature (Gollier 2001). All prudent agents dislike any increase in downside risk in the sense
of Menezes et al. (1980) (see also Chiu, 2005.). Deck and Schlesinger (2010) conduct a laboratory experiment to determine whether preferences are prudent and show behavioral evidence
for prudence. In this section, we will demonstrate that we can get additional dependence conditions for asset price and equity premium than first-degree expectation dependence, when the
representative agent is risk averse and prudent.
We can integrate the right-hand term of (16) by parts and obtain:
Z +∞

covt [u0 (c̃t+1 ), x̃t+1 ] =

−∞
Z +∞

=

−∞

F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )u00 (ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 )dct+1
u00 (ct+1 )d(

= u00 (ct+1 )
−

Z +∞ Z
−∞

−∞
ct+1

−∞

= u00 (+∞)
−

Z ct+1

Z +∞ Z
−∞

−∞

−∞

[E x̃t+1 − E(x̃t+1 |c̃t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1 (s)ds)

[E x̃t+1 − E(x̃t+1 |c̃t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1 (s)ds|+∞
−∞

[E x̃t+1 − E(x̃t+1 |c̃t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1 (s)dsu000 (ct+1 )dct+1

Z +∞
−∞
ct+1

Z ct+1

(27)

[E x̃t+1 − E(x̃t+1 |c̃t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1 (s)ds

[E x̃t+1 − E(x̃t+1 |c̃t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1 (s)dsu000 (ct+1 )dct+1

= u00 (+∞)covt (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) −

Z +∞
−∞

SED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )u000 (ct+1 )dct+1 .

From equation (7), we know that a positive SED implies a positive cov(x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) but the
converse is not true. Hence, we have from (27) that covt (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ≥ 0 is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for covt [u0 (c̃t+1 ), x̃t+1 ] ≤ 0 for all u00 ≤ 0 and u000 ≥ 0. With a positive SED
function, prudence is also necessary.
(11) and (12) can be rewritten as:
Et x̃t+1
f
| R
{z }

pt =

− βcovt (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 )[−

discounted present value ef f ect

−β
|

Z +∞
−∞

SED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )[
{z

|

{z

u00 (+∞)
]
u0 (ct )

(28)

}

covariance ef f ect

u000 (ct+1 )
]dct+1
u0 (ct )

}

second−degree expectation dependence ef f ect

or
pt =

Et x̃t+1
− βcovt (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 )AR(+∞)M RS+∞,ct
Rf
−β

Z +∞
−∞

SED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )AP (ct+1 )M RSct+1 ,ct dct+1 ,

12

(29)

where AP (x) =

u000 (x)
u0 (x)

is the index of absolute prudence7 , and

Et R̃t+1 − Rf

(30)

= covt (R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 )[−
|

{z

u00 (+∞)
]+
Et u0 (c̃t+1 )
}

consumption covariance ef f ect

Z +∞
|

−∞

SED(R̃t+1 |ct+1 )
{z

u000 (ct+1 )
dct+1
Et u0 (c̃t+1 )

}

consumption second−degree expectation dependence ef f ect

or
Et R̃t+1 − Rf

(31)

= βRf covt (R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 )AR(+∞)M RSc,ct
+βRf

Z +∞
−∞

SED(R̃t+1 |ct+1 )AP (ct+1 )M RSct+1 ,ct dct+1 .

Condition (28) includes three terms. The first one is the same as in condition (17). The second
term on the right-hand side of (28) is called the “covariance effect.” This term involves β, the
covariance of asset return and consumption, the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient and the
marginal rates of substitution. The third term on the right-hand side of (28) is called “seconddegree expectation dependence effect,” which reflects the way in which second-degree expectation
dependence of risk affects asset’s price through the intensity of downside risk aversion. Again
(28) affirms that positive correlation is only a necessary condition for all risk averse and prudent
agents to pay a lower price. Equation (30) shows that a positive SED reinforces the positive
covariance effect to obtain a positive risk premium.
We state the following propositions without proof. The proofs of these propositions are
similar to the proofs of Propositions in Section 3, and are therefore skipped. They are available
from the authors.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) and F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) are continuous, then the following
statements hold:
Et x̃t+1
Rf

(i) pt ≤

for any risk averse and prudent representative agent (u00 ≤ 0 and u000 ≥ 0) if

and only if (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ F2 ;
(ii) pt ≥

Et x̃t+1
Rf

for any risk averse and prudent representative agent (u00 ≤ 0 and u000 ≥ 0) if

and only if (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ G2 ;
(iii) Et R̃t+1 ≥ Rf for any risk averse and prudent representative agents (u00 ≤ 0 and u000 ≥ 0)
if and only if (R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ F2 ;
7

Modica and Scarsini (2005), Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010) propose
000

(x)
instead of − uu00 (x)
(Kimball, 1990) as an alternative candidate to evaluate the intensity of prudence.
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u000 (x)
u0 (x)

(iv) Et R̃t+1 ≤ Rf for any risk averse and prudent representative agents (u00 ≤ 0 and u000 ≥ 0)
if and only if (R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ G2 .
Modica and Scarsini (2005) provide a comparative statics criterion for downside risk in the
spirit of Ross (1981).
Definition 4.2 (Modica and Scarsini 2005) u is more downside risk averse than v if and only
if there exists λ > 0 such that for all x, y
u000 (x)
u0 (y)
≥
λ
≥
.
v 000 (x)
v 0 (y)

(32)

More downside risk aversion can guarantee that the decision-maker with a utility function that
has more downside risk aversion is willing to pay more to avoid the downside risk increase as
defined by Menezes et al. (1980). We can therefore extend Proposition 3.3 as follows:
Proposition 4.3 Suppose u0 , v 0 , u000 and v 000 are continuous, then the following statements hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ F2 if and only if v is more Ross and downside risk averse
than u;
(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ G2 if and only if u is more Ross and downside risk averse
than v;
We also obtain the following results for changes in joint distributions.
Proposition 4.4 (i) Suppose F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) is continuous and EtF x̃t+1 = EtH x̃t+1 , then pFt ≤ pH
t
for all risk averse and prudent representative agents if and only if F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) is more seconddegree expectation dependent than H(xt+1 , ct+1 );
(ii) Suppose F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) is continuous, then for all risk averse and prudent representative
agents, F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) is more second-degree expectation dependent than H(Rt+1 , ct+1 ) if and
only if the risk premium under F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) is greater than under H(Rt+1 , ct+1 ).
Corollary 4.5 For all risk averse and prudent representative agents, EtF x̃t+1 ≤ EtH x̃t+1 and
F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) is more second-degree expectation dependent than H(xt+1 , ct+1 ) implies pFt ≤ pH
t ;

4.2

C-CAPM for a higher-order representative agent

Ekern (1980) provides the following definition to sign the higher-order risk attitude.
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Definition 4.6 (Ekern 1980) An agent u is N th degree risk averse, if and only if
(−1)N u(N ) (x) ≤ 0 f or all x,

(33)

where u(N ) (·) denotes the N th derivative of u(x).
Ekern (1980) shows that all agents having utility function with N th degree risk aversion dislike
a probability change if and only if it produces an increase in N th degree risk. Risk aversion
in the traditional sense of a concave utility function is indicated by N = 2. When N = 3, we
obtain u000 ≥ 0 which means that marginal utility is convex, or implies prudence. Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) derive a class of lottery pairs to show that lottery preferences are compatible
with Ekern’s N th degree risk aversion.
Jindapon and Neilson (2007) generalize Ross’ risk aversion to higher-order risk aversion.
Definition 4.7 (Jindapon and Neilson 2007) u is more N th -degree Ross risk averse than v if
and only if there exists λ > 0 such that for all x, y
u(N ) (x)
u0 (y)
.
≥
λ
≥
v 0 (y)
v (N ) (x)

(34)

Li (2009) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010) provide context-free explanations for higher-order
Ross risk aversion. In Appendix B, we generalize the results of Section 3 and 4 to higher-degree
risks and higher order representative agents.

5

Asset prices and two local absolute indexes of risk attitude

If we assume that c̃t and c̃t+1 are close enough, then we can use the local coefficient of risk
aversion and local downside risk aversion (see Modica and Scarsini, 2005) to obtain the following
approximation formulas for (17) and (28):
Z

pt ≈
=

u00 (ct ) +∞
Et x̃t+1
+
β
F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )Fct+1 (ct+1 )dct+1
Rf
u0 (ct ) −∞
Et x̃t+1
− βAR(ct )covt (x̃t+1 , ct+1 )
Rf

(35)

and
Z

pt ≈
=

u00 (ct )
u000 (ct ) +∞
Et x̃t+1
+
β
cov
(x̃
,
c̃
)
−
β
SED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )dct+1
t
t+1
t+1
Rf
u0 (ct )
u0 (ct ) −∞
Z +∞
Et x̃t+1
−
βAR(c
)cov
(x̃
,
c̃
)
−
βAP
(c
)
SED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )dct+1 .
t
t t+1 t+1
t
Rf
−∞
15

(36)

When the variation of consumption is small, (35) implies that absolute risk aversion and covariance determine asset prices while (36) implies that absolute risk aversion, absolute prudence,
covariance and SED determine asset prices. We mentioned before that SED(x̃|y) is related to
the 2nd central cross lower partial moment of x̃ and ỹ, hence (36) provides a theoretical explanation of the importance of higher-order risk preferences, higher-order moments and comoments
in finance. We must emphasize that we obtain only approximations of asset prices when we use
Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion and Kimball measure of prudence.

6

Concluding remarks on the equity premium puzzle

We discuss the implications of our results on the equity premium puzzle. The major discrepancy
between the C-CAPM model predictions and empirical reality is identified as the equity premium
puzzle in the literature. As mentioned in Section 3, the key empirical observations of the equity
premium puzzle based on (13) can be summarized as follows:
When the representative agent’s utility function is the power function, and c̃t+1 and x̃t+1
are conditional lognormally distributed, the observed equity premium can be explained only by
assuming a very high coefficient of relative risk aversion. Moreover, it is also difficult to explain
the existence of observed high risk premia with the covariance because of the smoothness of
consumption over time. However, the equity premium puzzle conclusion is built on specific
utility functions and return distributions. Our results show that, for general utility functions
and distributions, covariance is not the key element of equity premium prediction. It is very
easy to find counter intuitive results. For example, given positively correlated gross return
and consumption distributions, a lower Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion may
result in a higher equity premium. Alternatively, given a representative agent’s preference, a
lower covariance between gross return and consumption may result in a higher equity premium.
Therefore, (13) is not a robust theoretical prediction of equity premia.
Our results prove that asset pricing’s comparative statics imply the following robust predictions:
(a) expectation dependence between payoff and consumption determines asset riskiness
rather than covariance;
(b) when a representative agent’s risk preference satisfies higher-order risk aversion, more
expectation dependence between payoff and consumption is equivalent to a lower price.
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(c) when a representative agent’s risk preference satisfies higher-order risk aversion, more
expectation dependence between gross return and consumption is equivalent to a higher equity
premium.
(d) when payoff and consumption are positive expectation dependent, higher risk aversion
in the sense of Ross is equivalent to a lower equity price;
Because the comparative Ross risk aversion is fairly restrictive upon preference, some readers
may regard (d) as a negative result, because no standard utility functions satisfy such condition
on the whole domain. However, some utility functions satisfy comparative Ross risk aversion on
some domain. For example, Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010)
(N )

assert that (−1)N +1 uu0 is an appropriate local index of N th order risk attitude. Nonetheless,
some readers may think that because no standard utility functions satisfy these conditions,
experimental methods to identify these conditions may need to be developed. Ross (1981),
Modica and Scarsini (2005), Li (2009) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010) provide context-free
experiments for comparative Ross risk aversion. More research is needed in both directions to
develop the theoretical foundations for C-CAPM. This paper takes a first step in that direction.
We have proposed a new unified interpretation to C-CAPM, which we have related to the equity
premium puzzle problem. Our results are important because C-CAPM shares the positive
versus normative tensions that prevail in finance and economics to explain asset prices and
equity premia.

7
7.1

Appendix A: Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 3.1

(i): The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (17) and (18). We prove the necessity
using a contradiction. Suppose that F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 ) < 0 for c0t+1 . Because of the continuity of
F ED(x̃|y), we have F ED(x̃t+1 |c0t+1 ) < 0 in interval [a,b]. Choose the following utility function:




αx − e−a




ū(x) =

αx − e−x





−b

αx − e
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x<a
a≤x≤b
x > b,

(37)

where α > 0. Then

ū0 (x) =





α




x<a

α + e−x





 α

(38)

a≤x≤b
x>b

and

ū00 (x) =





0




x<a

−e−x






0

(39)

a≤x≤b
x > b.

Therefore,
pt =

1
Et x̃t+1
−β 0
f
R
u (ct )

Z b
a

F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )FCt+1 (ct+1 )e−ct+1 dct+1 >

Et x̃t+1
.
Rf

(40)

This is a contradiction.
(ii) (iii) and (iv): We can prove them using the same approach used in (i).

7.2

Proof of Proposition 3.3

(i): The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (17), and (21). We prove the necessity
by a contradiction. Suppose that there exists some ct+1 and ct such that

u00 (ct+1 )
v 00 (ct+1 )

>

u0 (ct )
v 0 (ct ) .

Because u0 , v 0 , u00 and v 00 are continuous, there exists a neighborhood [γ1 , γ2 ], such that
u00 (ct+1 )
u0 (ct )
> 0
f or all (ct+1 , ct ) ∈ [γ1 , γ2 ],
00
v (ct+1 )
v (ct )

(41)

−u00 (ct+1 )
u0 (ct )
>
f or all (ct+1 , ct ) ∈ [γ1 , γ2 ],
−v 00 (ct+1 )
v 0 (ct )

(42)

u00 (ct+1 )
v 00 (ct+1 )
>− 0
f or all (ct+1 , ct ) ∈ [γ1 , γ2 ].
0
u (ct )
v (ct )

(43)

hence

and
−

If F (x, y) is a distribution function such that F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )FY (y) is strictly positive on interval
[γ1 , γ2 ] and is equal to zero on other intervals, then we have
put − pvt = β

Z γ2
γ1

F ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )FY (y)[

u00 (ct+1 ) v 00 (ct+1 )
− 0
] < 0.
u0 (ct )
v (ct )

This is a contradiction.
(ii): We can prove them using the same approach used in (i).
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(44)

7.3

Proof of Proposition 3.4

(i) The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (17), and (26). We prove the necessity using a contradiction. Suppose F EDF (x̃t+1 |ct+1 )FCt+1 (ct+1 ) < F EDH (x̃t+1 |ct+1 )HCt+1 (ct+1 ) for
c0t+1 . Owing to the continuity of F EDF (x̃t+1 |ct+1 )FCt+1 (ct+1 ) − F EDH (x̃t+1 |ct+1 )HCt+1 (ct+1 ),
we have F EDF (x̃t+1 |c0t+1 )FCt+1 (c0t+1 ) < F EDH (x̃t+1 |c0t+1 )HCt+1 (c0t+1 ) in interval [a,b]. Choose
the following utility function:




αx − e−a




ū(x) =

αx − e−x





−b

αx − e

x<a
a≤x≤b

(45)

x > b,

where α > 0. Then

ū0 (x) =





α




x<a

α + e−x






α

a≤x≤b

(46)

x>b

and

ū00 (x) =





0




x<a

−e−x






0

a≤x≤b

(47)

x > b.

Therefore,
pFt − pH
t
= β

(48)

1

Z b

u0 (ct )

a

[F EDH (x̃t+1 |ct+1 )FCt+1 (ct+1 ) − F EDF (x̃t+1 |y)FCt+1 (ct+1 )]e−ct+1 dct+1 > 0.

(ii): We can prove them using the same approach used in (i).

8

Appendix B: Higher-order risks and higher order representative agents

In this section, we suppose x̃ × ỹ ∈ [a, b] × [d, e], where a, b, d and e are finite. Rewriting
1th ED(x̃|y) = F ED(x̃|y), 2th ED(x̃|y) = SED(x̃|y) =
yield:
N th ED(x̃|y) =

Z y
d

Ry
d

F ED(x̃|t)FY (t)dt, repeated integrals

(N − 1)th ED(x̃|t)dt, f or N ≥ 3.
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(49)

Definition 8.1 (Li 2011) If k th ED(x̃|e) ≥ 0, for k = 2, ..., N − 1 and
N th ED(x̃|y) ≥ 0 f or all y ∈ [d, e],

(50)

then x̃ is positive N th -order expectation dependent on ỹ (N th ED(x̃|y)).
The family of all distributions F satisfying (50) will be denoted by FN . Similarly, x̃ is negative
N th -order expectation dependent on ỹ if (50) holds with the inequality sign reversed, and the
totality of negative N th -order expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by GN . From
this definition, we know that FN −1 ⊆ FN and GN −1 ⊆ GN but the converse is not true. N th order expectation dependence is related to N th -order central cross lower partial moment of x̃
and ỹ (See, Li (2011) for more details). Several recent researches in finance have focused on
estimators of higher-order moments and comoments of the return distribution (i.e. coskewness
and cokurtosis) and showed that these estimates generate a better explanation of investors’
portfolios. (see, Martellini and Ziemann (2010) for more details).
Definition 8.2 Define ith EDF and ith EDH , for i = 1, .., N , as the ith expectation dependence
under distribution F (x, y) and H(x, y) respectively. Distribution F (x, y) is more first-degree
expectation dependent than H(x, y), if and only if F EDF (x̃|y)FY (y) ≥ F EDH (x̃|y)HY (y) for
all y ∈ [d, e]. Distribution F (x, y) is more N th -order expectation dependent than H(x, y) for
N ≥ 2, if k th EDF (x̃|e) ≥ k th EDH (x̃|e), for k = 2, ..., N − 1 and
N th EDF (x̃|y) ≥ N th EDH (x̃|y) f or all y ∈ [d, e].

(51)

Suppose (x̃t+1 , R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ [x, x] × [R, R] × [c, c]. We integrate the right-hand term of (16)
by parts repeatedly until we obtain:
cov[u0 (c̃t+1 ), x̃t+1 ] =

N
X

(−1)k u(k) (c)k th ED(x̃t+1 |c)

(52)

k=2

+

Z c
c

(−1)N +1 u(N +1) (ct+1 )N th ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )dct+1 , f or n ≥ 2.

Then (11) and (12) can be rewritten as:
Et x̃t+1
f
| R
{z }

pt =

discounted present value ef f ect

−β
|

Z c
c

−β
|

N
X

k th ED(x̃t+1 |c)[(−1)k+1

k=2

{z

u(k) (c)
]
u0 (ct )

}

higher−order cross moments ef f ect

N th ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )[(−1)N +2
{z

u(N +1) (ct+1 )
]dct+1
u0 (ct )

N th −order expectation dependence ef f ect
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}

(53)

N
X
Et x̃t+1
−
β
k th ED(x̃t+1 |c)AR(k) (c)M RSc,ct
Rf
k=2

=

−β

Z c

N th ED(x̃t+1 |ct+1 )AR(k+1) (ct+1 )M RSct+1 ,ct dct+1

c

(k)

(x)
is the absolute index of k th order risk aversion, and
where AR(k) (x) = (−1)k+1 uu0 (x)

Et R̃t+1 − Rf
N
X

=

k th ED(R̃t+1 |c)[(−1)k+1

k=2 |

+

(54)

{z

Z c
c

u(k) (c)
Et u0 (c̃t+1 )

]

}

consumption cross moments ef f ect

N th ED(R̃t+1 |ct+1 )[(−1)N +2
|

{z

u(N +1) (ct+1 )
] dct+1
Et u0 (c̃t+1 )
}

N th degree expectation dependence ef f ect

= βRf

N
X

k th ED(R̃t+1 |c)AR(k) (c)M RSc,ct

k=2

+βRf

Z c
c

N th ED(R̃t+1 |ct+1 )AR(k+1) (ct+1 )M RSct+1 ,ct dct+1 .

Condition (53) includes three terms. The first one is the same as in condition (17). The second
term on the right-hand side of (53) is called the “higher-order cross moments effect.” This term
involves β, the intensity of higher-order risk aversion, the marginal rates of substitution and the
higher-order cross moments of asset return and consumption. The third term on the right-hand
side of (53) is called “N th − degree expectation dependence effect,” which reflects the way in
which N th -degree expectation dependence of risks affects asset price through the intensity of
absolute N th risk aversion and the marginal rates of substitution.
We state the following propositions without proof (The proofs of these propositions are
similar to the proofs of propositions in Section 3, and are therefore skipped. They are however
available from the authors.).
Proposition 8.3 Suppose F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) and F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) are continuous, then the following
statements hold:
(i) pt ≤

Et x̃t+1
Rf

for any ith risk averse representative agent with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only

if (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ FN ;
(ii) pt ≥

Et x̃t+1
Rf

for any ith risk averse representative agent with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only

if (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ GN ;
(iii) Et R̃t+1 ≥ Rf for any ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and
only if (R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ FN ;
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(iv) Et R̃t+1 ≤ Rf for any ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and
only if (R̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ GN .
Proposition 8.3 suggests that, for an ith -degree risk averse representative agent with i = 1, .., n =
1, an asset’s price is lowered if and only if its payoff N th -order is positively expectation dependent
on consumption. Conversely, an asset’s price is raised if and only if it N th -order is negatively
expectation dependent on consumption. Therefore, for ith -degree representative agents with
i = 1, .., N + 1, it is the N th -order expectation dependence that determines its riskiness. The
next two propositions and Corollary 8.6 have a similar general intuition when compared with
those in Section 3.
Proposition 8.4 Suppose u0 , v 0 , uN +1 and v N +1 are continuous, then the following statements
hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ FN if and only if v is more ith risk averse than u for
i = 2, ..., N + 1;
(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x̃t+1 , c̃t+1 ) ∈ GN if and only if u is more ith risk averse than v for
i = 2, ..., N + 1;
Proposition 8.5 (i) Suppose F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) is continuous and EtF x̃t+1 = EtH x̃t+1 , then pFt ≤ pH
t
for all ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only if F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) is
N th more expectation dependent than H(xt+1 , ct+1 );
(ii) Suppose F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) is continuous, then for all ith risk averse representative agents
with i = 2, ..., N + 1,, F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) is more ith -degree expectation dependent than H(Rt+1 , ct+1 )
if and only if the risk premium under F (Rt+1 , ct+1 ) is greater than H(Rt+1 , ct+1 ).
Corollary 8.6 For all ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1, EtF x̃t+1 ≤
EtH x̃t+1 and F (xt+1 , ct+1 ) is more N th -degree expectation dependent than H(xt+1 , ct+1 ) implies
pFt ≤ pH
t ;
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